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1 . INTRODUCTION 
Professors  Peacock and Shaw i n  t h e i r  a r t i c l e  i n  Pub l i c  ~ i n a n c e /  
Finances Publiques,  No.3/1971, seeks t o  f i n d  out which of t h e  two 
f i s c a l  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  inc reas ing  employment i n  developing count r ies  
would be p re fe rab le  : (1 ) t o  g ive  a subsidy r e l a t e d  t o  employment or 
(2 )  t o  impose a t a x  on c a p i t a l .  
Though they  don1 t say it so  e x p l i c i t l y ,  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  s e t  f o r  
adjudging which one o f  t h e  two a l t e r n a t i v e s  posed i s  t o  be p r e f e r r e d  
should read something l i k e  t h i s :  If t he  t o t a l  amount of  t a x  t o  be 
imposed on c a p i t a l  works out t o  be l e s s  than t h e  t o t a l  amount o f  
suljsidy which would have t d  be g iven  on employment i n  order t o  obta in  
a g iven  s h i f t  from c a p i t a l * t o  employment, t h e n  t h e  former is t o  be 
p re fe r red ;  i f  it i s  the  o ther  way round, then t h e  employment subsidy 
i s  t o  be p re fe r red  to  c a p i t a l  tax .  
Using the  Cobb-Douglas pro,iuction funct ion ,  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
cond i t ion  ( i . ~ ,  , i n  addi t ion  t o  %he condi t ions  i m p l i c i t  i n  the  Cobb- 
Douglas production f u n c t i o n ) ,  which Peacock and 'haw p o s t u l a t e  i n  
* The authors a r e  e r a t o f u 1  f o r  The very u6oful comments and suggestions 
by Professors  A.K. Sen,  P.K. 3ardhan and K.N. R a j  on t h e i r  e a r l i e r  
d r a f t  of t h i s  note but  they t.&e f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  note 
i n  i t s  f i n a l  form. 
a r r i v i n g  at t h e i r  r e s u l t ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  budget should be balanced such 
t h a t  if a given amount i s  paid by way of employment subsidy i t  must 
be matched by the ' same amount of t a x  t o  be r a i s e d  i n  t h e  form of out. 
put  t a x ;  l ikewise  i f  a given amount i s  r a i s e d  by way of c a p i t a l  t a x  
it must be matched by an output  subsidy involving an equivalent  amount( 
The r e s u l t  a r r ived  a t  i s  t h a t  whether t h e  amount t o  be r a i s e d  
i n  c a p i t a l  would have t o  be higher  or l e s s  than the  amount t o  be paid 
i n  employment subs idy  would depend upon t h e  e x i s t i n g  r a t i o  of  f a c t o r  
sha res  of labour  and c a p i t a l .  According t o  Peacock and Shaw, t h e  r a t  
o f  labour subsidy t o  c a p i t a l  t a x  t u r n s  out t o  be t h e  same as t he  ratiq 
of t h e  share of labour  t o  t h a t  o f  c a p i t a l .  i n  t h e s e  circumstances,  ii 
the  share  of labour  i s  higher than  t h a t  of c a p i t a l ,  then i t  should be 
p re fe rab le  t o  seek  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  s h i f t  from c a p i t a l  t o  labour through 
a t a x  on c a p i t a l  r a t h e r  than through a subsidy on employment. Since, 
according to  them, t h e  labour sha re  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be higher than  the 
c a p i t a l  sha re ,  developing c o u n t r i e s  should impose 'a capf ta l ' thx  than 
g r a n t  .an employment subsidy. 
According t o  t h e  Peacock-Shaw formulat ion,  as o u t l i n e d  above, 
i t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t '  t n e  l e v e l  o f  output d e c l i n e s  as a 
"trade-off'? f o r  increased employment r e g a r d l e s s  o f  whether r e s o r t  i s  
made t o  labour  subsidy o r  c a p i t a l  t ax .  T h i s  comes 'out c l e a r l y  i n  
t h e i r  diagram which wa reproduce 'below ' ( see  Diagram 1 ). The p o s t - t d  
cum-subsidy output  i n  both t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  posed, at  p o i n t  B,  l i e s  
on a lower isoquant than.  t h e  output at p o i n t  A. A s  t h e y  themselves 
. . 
say, "whatever the method adopted, i t  w i l l  be noted . t h a t  t h e  increasd 
employment of  labour  is obtained only at t h e  expense of  a l o s s  of 
1 
output and t h e  unemployment of c a p i t a l v .  
The above r e s u l t  i s  c l e a r l y  r e l a t e d  t o  the  se l f - f inancing  
assumption made by Peacock and Shaw which imposes the balanced budget 
c o n s t r a i n t  on t h e  Government. Even though t h e  budget c o n s t r a i n t  i s  
put f o r t h  pure ly  as a methodological dev ice ,  f ts output impl ica t ions  
cannot be overlooked e a s i l y .  Once t h e  balanced budget cons t ra in% i s  
imposed, i t  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  the  t o t a l  output  doc l ines ,  s i n c e  the  
prevlous l e v e l  of output  could be pro3uced w i t h  t h e  new f a c t o r  combina- 
at 
ti03 only/a higher l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  c o s t .  Thus, although i n  the  Peacock- 
Shaw formulat ion a f o r m d  balance i s  sought t o  be maintafned betwoen 
Government r e c e i p t s  and expendi ture ,  t hero i s  , impl ic i t  i n  t h e i r  
formulation a more important imbalance w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  output because 
t h e  budget i s  balanced at a lower l e v e l  of ou tpu t .  
It i s  t r u e  t h a t  Peacock and Shaw speak a l s o  of keeping t h e  t o t a l  
out lay  of the  f i rm cons tant .  On the  face  of  i t ,  t h i s  cons tant  out lay  
condi t ion could be s a i d  t o  d e r i v e  inrom t h e  balanced budgct constrain?; 
i n  t h a t  once i t  i s  assumed t h a t  UtCiu; cap i t& t a x  i s  o f f s e t  by an 
equicost  subsidy which does no t  d i s t o r t  f a c t o r  p r i c e s ,  and t 0 ; u t  labour 
subsidy i s  o f f s e t  by a t a x  o f  e@Zb y i e l d  which too  does n o t  d i s t o r t  
f a c t o r  p r i c ~ s ,  it  i s  almost t a u t $ W o g i c d  t o  say  t h a t  t h o  f i r m ' s  o u t l a y  
remains cons tant .  Thus tho  out1a.y cons t r 'dn t  becomos redundant when 
1 .  Soo also  A l a n  T. Peacock and G.K. Shaw, I7Fiscal  Polirry m d  t h e  
Employment Problem i n  Less Dl :veloped Countries1' , OECD Employment 
S e r i e s ,  No .5/1971 . The poinx regarding t r ade -o f f  between output  
and employment i s  e labora ted  upon by the  au thors  i n  Chapter 111. 
t h e  balanced budget c o n s t r a i n t  i s  adhered t o .  A s  w e  hope t o  show 
l a t e r ,  however, maintaining a f i r m ' s  o u t l a y  i s  a cond i t ion  t h a t  can 
be secured even without i n s i s t i n g  on a balanced budget. 
The ques t ion  rernahs, however, whether i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
problem posed, namely choice between c a p i t a l  t a x  and employment subsiq 
it i s  at all e s s e n t i d l  t o  proceed on t h e  basis of  the  above constralnd 
A s  pointed out e a r l i e r ,  i n  t h e  Peacock-Shaw s o l u t i o n  t h e r e  is 
a " t rade-off"  between employment and output  <and an i n c r e a s e  i n  employ- 
ment i s  obtained at  a lower l e v e l  o f  output .  While i t  is pe r fec t ly  
t r u e  t h a t  under-developed count r ies  wi th  labour  surcplus would l i k e  t o  
r a i s e  t h e  l e v e l  of employment as far as p o s s i b l e ,  they would, at the 
same time, be averse t o  t h e  idea of  t h e  output  f a l l i n g  from what is 
l i k e l y  t o  be 'alrecady a low l e v e l .  I s  it poss ib le  to  achieve the  same 
i nc rease  i n  employment without  any accompanying fdl in'.ou.tpuf? ',kiven 
the  employment ob jec t ive ,  could no t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  the  choice .of the 
pol icy  instrument  i.e., of employment subsidy or c a p i t a l  t a x ,  be' 
determined without having t o  f a c e  m y  dec l ine  i n  the l e v e l  of output? 
Lot us  exanine t h e  impl ica t ions  of inc reas ing  employment whila 
a t  the same time maintnining t h e  same ( i . e . ,  before t h e  proposed f i - scq  
act ion)  l e v e l  of output .  Thus, constancy of t h e  l e v e l  of output b c c a  
a c c n s t r a i n t .  While w e  do fiat in?pose any a d d i t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t ,  we 
s t i l l  fol low Peacock md Shaw i n  t h a t  our own demonstration does 
envisage o f f s e t t i n g  budget opera t ions  of t h e  tybe used by them, viz. ,  
c a p i t a l  tax t o  be o f f s e t  by an output  subsidy and labour subsidy t o  be: 
o f f s e t  by an output  tax without d i s t o r t i n g  f a c t o r  p r i ces .  However, 
t h e  o f f s e t t i n g  budgetary operat ions '  we envisage do  not  have to  secure 
a balanced budget. Thip s i t u a t i o n  i s  demonstrated i n  Diagram 2. 
, The s l o p e  o f  t h e  l i n e  AB g ives  t h e  f a c t o r  p r i c e  r a t i o  i n  the  
pre-tax-cum-subsidy s i tua t ion . ,  When a t a x  on c a p i t a l  i s  imposed, t h e  
new post - tax  p,r ice  r a t i o  is  given by the  s lope  of BC. Now, s i n c e  the  
output has t o  be maintained a t  the pre- tax l e v e l ,  l e t  us d r a w  a l i n e  
DE p a r a l l e l  t o  BC and the  p o i n t  of tangency o f  DE w i t h  t h e  i soquant  
QQl provides f o r  increased enployment of labour  without any f a l l  i n  
output. A t  $ h i s  new f a c t o r  p r i c e  r a t i o ,  however, the t o t a l  c o s t  o f  
m production would have increased  i n  the  propor t ion  of -. OB 
Let us excamhe t h e  budgetary impl ica t ions  of  t h e  above s i t u a t i o n ,  
For t h i s  Furpose,  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  i s  t o  f i n d  o u t  the  mount of revanue 
t h a t  crm be c o l l e c t e d  from t h e  c a p i t a l  tax .  Le* us d r a w  A t B 1  ( p a r d . l e l  
t o  AB) but  i n t e r s e c t i n g  DE at  its point  of tangency w i t h  QQ' . The 
amount of c a p i t a l  t'ax co l l ec ted .  by t h e  Government w i l l  be i n  t h e  propor- 
'3 'D t i o n  o f  -'-. The next s t ep .  i s  t o  find out  t h e  amount o f  output  subsidy OB 
which would have t o  be g iven  by way of coun te rve i l ing  budgetary operRtion 
f o r  maintaining the  output at the o l d ' l e v e l  but at the  new f a c t o r  p r i c e  
r a t i o .  A s  shown above, the  t o t a l  cos t  o f  product ion would have a r i s e n  
BD i n  the propor t ion  o f  I f  t h e  Government were to..make good t h e  OB 
increase i n  t o t a l  c o s t  by an output  subsidy, the  subsidy w i l l  have t o  
BD be i n  the  propor t ion  of  - thereby keeping t h e  f i r m 1  s out lay  unchanged, OB ' 
It can thus  be s s e n  t h a t  while t h e  amount o f  t a x  c o l l e c t e d  would be 
i n  the  proport ion of ED t h e  counter-vei l ing output  subsidy would have OB ' 
t o  be i n  t h e  propor t ion  of BD - t hus  involving a n e t  subeidy i n  t h e  OB ' -
g r  opor t i o n  of =' and a corresponding budget d e f i c i t .  OB 
I f ,  i n s t e a d  o f  a t a x  on czpi t -al ,  t he  g iven  employment ta rge t  
i s  t o  ba reached by a labour  subs idy  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  
can a l s o  be i l l t l s t r g t e d  i n  t h e  srune di,agram. The slope o f  the  line 
AF gives the post-subsidy p r i c e - r a t i o  and i t  is drawn p a r a l l e l  t o  DE. 
M; AB, and the subs idy  w i l l  be i n  t h e  proport ion o f  - . The zmount of 0 A 
output  t a x  t h a t  ckn be Collected without d i s t u r b i n g  t h e  level of o u t p q  
which, according Lo our c o n s t r a i n t ,  must be maintained at t he  ?re- 
AIG 
subsidy level, will be i n  t h e  propor t ion  of - . Oh 
.CT Since  - and A'G - a r e  equal t o  BP 0 A O k  8?T and -, * I F  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  w e  c;lrr. OB 
also oxpress  cbrrespondingly the labour subsidy and i t s  counter -veilby 
* 
- BF Thus expressed,  i t  can be seen t h a t  i f  t h e  output tcax as - and - O B  OB 
Government uses t h e  instrument  of c a p i t a l  t a x  or  employment subsidy 
in o r d s r ' t o  maintcziri the .  scmc level  of ou tpu t ,  i t  would have to incur 
t he  same l e v e l  of budget d e f i c i t  i i n  e i t h e r  case. 
L 
V k a t  d i a g r m  2 dononstratzs i s  that .  i n  o rde r  t o  s e c u r e  a given , 
increase  in employment, while at the  sane time maizltail; i?@' the praviod 
l e v e l  o f  ou tpu t ,  t he  choice cf e i t h e r  of the. t w o  f i s c a l  instruments, v:' 
capital C a x  o r  sinploymen% subs idy ,  r e s u l % s  i n  t h e  same level o f  b u d ~ e t  
d e f i c i t .  This  r o s u l t , '  i t  must be a l s o  seen,' i s  obtained independ&tly 
of  what t he  p re -cap i t a l - t ax  o r  pre- labour  subsidy f a c t o r  sh&e ratiq 
xre between labour  and c x p i t a l  . 
Thus, if t h e  c r i t e r i o n  ' for  tho choice  of f i s c a l  instrument w e r e  
the level of budgetary deficit, which, w e  f e e l ,  is a far more imrort.mt 
cons idera t ion  i n  terms of i t s  impact on t h e  o v e r a l l  economy than the 
s i z e  of the .budge t  i t s e l f ,  we re:rch a p o s i t i o n  where either - .. of t h e  t w o  
f i s c a l  instruments,.  o r  oven a combination of them, could be picked up 
without any r e s e r v a t i o n  on t h e  above score .  
111. CHOICE OF THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
The c h o i r e  of  the Cobb-Douglas production funct ion ,  though q u i t e  
c r u c i a l  t o  the r a s u l t  obtained by Peacock ,md Shaw, i s  i t s e l f  f raught  
w i t h  sevarnl  ques t ions .  I t s  re levance  t o  even developed c o u n t r i e s  i s  
o f t e n  questioned ; i n  developing count r ies  i t s  usef  ulnaas might be oven 
more quest ionable .  Furthor , t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  production funct ion  with 
i t s  i m p l i c i t  assumptions as t o  no t  only u n i t  e l a s t i c i t y  of s u b s t i t u t i o n  
but  a l s o  u n i t  p r i c e  and ou t l ay  elasticities o f  demand for  each of the 
i n p u t s  seems t o  u s  t o  impose unduly severe l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h c  ana lys i s  
o f  the problem posed. 
Besides, Peacock .and Shaw i n  t h e i r  app l i ca t ion  of the  r e s u l t  
based on tho  Cobb-Douglas production f u n c t i o n ,  appear t o  imply t h a t  , 
t h e  r a t i o  of  f a c t o r  shares  which might ob t rdn  for  t h e  economy as a whole 
would hold good f o r  the v a r i o u s  e a c t o r s ,  subsoctors  or i n d u s t r i e s ,  taken 
separa te ly .  They assume t h a t  normally the  labour  share would B X C ~ Q ~  
t h a t  nccruing t o  the  owners of t h e  c a p i t a l .  A s  var ious  s t u d i e s  :u'sing 
the production funct ion  o f  t h e  simple Cobb-Douglas type,  but excluding 
my provis ion f o r  evaluating technologica l  change, have i n d i c a t e d ,  t h i s  
might bo t r u e  f o r  the  economy zs a whole, but need not be s o  when d i s -  
aggregated production funct ions  are f i t t e d  t o  indus t ry  da ta .  Fur the r ,  
ava i l ab le  evidence,  though scan ty ,  seems t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  f o r  develop- 
ing  count r ies  t h e  share  of wages f o r  the manufacturing sec tor  as a 
whole is  l i k e l y  t o  be l e s s  than  half of  the va lue  added. 
For t h e  1ndi& mmufactur ing s e c t o r ,  f o r  ins t ance ,  the svorage 
share  of wages f o r  t h e  period 1950-64 works out  t o  l e s s  than 50 pe r  cent 
of 'tho va lue  When t h e  r a t i o  of wages i n  value added 5s 
est imated f o r  59 i n d u s t r i e s  f o r  t h e  year f 967, it i s  seen that it 
var ied  from 0.90 f o r  i r o n  and s t o e l  (which possibly,  inc ludes  a l a r g e  
number of s t e e l  f a b r i c a t i n g  u n i t s  as w e l l )  t o  0.172 f o r  petroleum 
re f in ing .  I n d u s t r i e s  where t h e  r a t i o  of wages t o  vdue added was 
found t o  be less than h a l f  accounted f o r  35% of the aggregate value 
added by ' d l  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  t h a t  ye.ar. 
IV. CONCLUSION' 
In  the  l i g h t  o f  t h e  above a n a l y s i s  i t  appears t o  us t h a t  contrq 
t o  t h e  claim of Professors  Peacock and Shaw, on pure ly  t h e o r e t i c a l  
srounds the  choice between c a p i t a l  t a x  and labour subsidy with a view 
t o  promoting employment i s  not  s o  c l e a r l y  ind ica ted .  The choice appea 
t o  us  t o  be s t i l l  an open one. Depending upon t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u e  
s t a n c e s  obtaining in  a country and w i t h i n  a country depending upon th.4 
c i r ~ u m s t m c e s  wi th in  a s~ctor/subsector/industry, t he  actual  choice ttid 
w e l l  bc made i n  favour  of one o r  the o ther  f i s c a l  t o o l  or e"YSYK-&erH 
combination o f  t h e  two. 
I n  t h e  l i g h t  of t h e  above f indings  t h e  observat ion o  f Feacock 
<and Shaw t h a t  i n  c e r t a i n  c i r  cums tcmces pragmatic reasons might w e l l  
argue in fqvour of a c a p i t a l  tax i s  not a t  a l l  d i f f i c u l t  t o  accept. 
In t h i s  connect ion t h e i r  r e fe r snca  to those economies * i c h  r e l y  op311 
2. See K .  Mukerji,  "Wages i n  Large-scale I n d u s t r i e s  and National  
Income, 1939-58", i n  N ' . S . R .  .3astri e t  a l ,  . ( e d s . ) ,  P a  ers on + Nat ional  Income and Al l ied  Topics,  Asia, Vo1.3, London 1 9 5 ,  
and M.M. Dadi and S .I?. Hashim, !'An Adjusted Cap i t a l  S e r i e s  fo r  
Ind ian  Mmuf a c t w i n g ,  1 946 -64~; , i n  ANVESAK, December 1  971 . 
h p o r t s  of capi ta l  equipment i s  very apt. Also we see no quarrel  with 
t h e i r  observation tha t  to  the extent  tha t  cap i t a l  items are used by a l l  
sectors  o f  the economy, the capi ta l  tax  would exer t  a widespread ef fec t  
s 
kpon the f a c t w  m i z .  B u t  we s:zspect that  Peacock and Shw overstate 
*Ithe disadvantages and d i f f i c u l t i e s  associated w i t h  labour subsidyq1. 
The one particulc?r ~ i n s ~ r r n o u n t a b l e ~ ~  d i f f i c u l t y  they re fer  t o  i n  
connection w i t h  l imiting the subsidy t o  the marginal. worker i s  tha t  
t 
any such attempt "would probably be accompanied by companies going 
into l5qu5db.tion one day and re-appearing as ent i re ly  new and ronaned 
:concerns on the next ". But t h i s  r ea l ly  i s  3 problem which authori t ies  
svon In developing countries are quite familiar with by now i n  the 
context of  vorious tax holiday schemes and the  problem has seaSonably 
and successfully been tackled a t  both l eg i s l a t ive  and administrntive 
h.e+e~s. 
It might be o f  i n t e res t  i n  t h i s  connection, tha t  a number of 
dcvoloping cuLmtries have s ta r ted  experimenting w i t h  subsidisfng 
i9cqxnent a1 labour employment. I n  Trlnidad and Tobago, for  instance,  
,an employment ' allowance, effect ive From 1972, has been offered f o r  
incremental employment i n  manufacturing industr ies ,  other t h a n  those 
spec i f ica l ly  excluded i n  the leg is la t ion .  While it is too soon t o  
-asse%wbether o r  not t h i s  part ioular measure has been successfully 
implemented, the l eg i s l a t ion  seers t o  have taken adequate safeguards 
a g d n s t  t h e  probLems of possible abase, par t icular ly  the one posed 
by Peacock and Shaw. 
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